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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic choice of variety by a monopolist seller of a
durable good as a means to mitigate his commitment problem. The monopolist
chooses his product variety with a goal of ensuring that a strong reduction in future
prices will not be profitable because it allows the firm to attract few additional
consumers. The main result that emerges from considering product variety as an
endogenous variable is that, contrary to the case in which it is exogenously
determined, social welfare is always higher when the monopolist cannot commit
that when he can.
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1. Introduction
The power held by a monopolist in the production and sale of a durable good can be
substantial but is significantly less than the power held by a monopolist who produces a non-
durable good. The monopolist seller of a durable good faces the problem of time inconsistency
when deciding on his optimal production path. In the case of the durable goods monopolist, the
credibility problem rests on whether or not he can commit to a future schedule of production. In
a dynamic theory of the durable goods monopoly, the time path of prices will generally not be
the one which, if a commitment to future prices were possible, would generate sales that
maximize the present value of the monopolist's profits.
This paper analyzes the strategic choice of product variety by a monopolist seller of a
durable good as a means to mitigate his commitment problems. The literature has examined
different possibilities which solve or mitigate this commitment problem: the good can be rented
rather than sold (Coase (1972)); capacity restrictions (Bulow (1982)); the establishment of
exclusive contracts in serving the product, that is, the transfer of monopoly power to services,
which are not durable (Bulow (1982)); planned obsolescence, that is, choice of product
durability (Coase (1972), Bulow (1986)); and the use of best-price provisions (Butz (1990)). In
our analysis, the monopolist who cannot commit to future production chooses to produce a
variety such that he credibly commits not to reduce future prices drastically.
It is very common in the durable goods monopolist literature to impose the existence of
an exogenously given demand (see Bulow (1982, 1986), Kahn (1986), Malueg and Solow
(1989)). However, firms frequently choose the variety of the good they will produce and, as a
result, they determine their own demand. For this reason it is interesting to analyze the
monopolist's choice of variety (or demand) from a strategic point of view. The more tractable
way to analyze this problem is to deal with the linear city model proposed by Hotelling (1929).
This frame, which is very useful for analyzing competition between rivals, is reasonable to use2
here because in the case of a durable goods monopolist, the firm faces its own future
competition. Moreover, this model provides locally linear demands, which allows us to
compare the results with the existing results in the durable goods monopolist literature.
The literature on durable goods has also analyzed the implications that the ability or
inability of commitment to a future schedule of production has for social welfare in different
scenarios (Bulow (1982), Kahn (1986), Kahn, Malueg and Solow (1988), Malueg and Solow
(1987, 1989), Bond and Samuelson (1987)). This paper analyzes the implications that the
choice of product variety has for social welfare by comparing the cases of the monopolist renter
and the monopolist seller. The main result that emerges from the analysis is that when product
variety is considered an endogenous variable, contrary to the case in which it is exogenously
determined, social welfare is always higher when the monopolist cannot commit than when he
can. The assumption that the variety is exogenously determined is implicit in the literature on
durable goods, e.g. Malueg and Solow (1989).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and solves for the
optimal choices of the monopolist who can commit (renter) and the monopolist who cannot
(seller). Section 3 compares the implications for social welfare under endogenous and
exogenous demand. Section 4 concludes with some final remarks.
2. The Model
Consider a monopolist in the production and sale of a durable good. The monopolist
must decide the variety of the good and the quantities to be produced. The good does not
depreciate over time. There are two discrete periods of time (j=1,2) and production occurs only
at the beginning of each period. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the marginal cost of
production of the good in each period is zero and the discount factor is one.1
1 The qualitative results of the paper do not change if the discount factor is assumed to be less than one.3
Purchasers are assumed to be price takers and to have perfect foresight. Each period
each consumer wishes to make use of one unit of the durable good. Each consumer has a
different preferred variety of the good which does not change over time and consumers' tastes
are distributed uniformly over the varieties interval [0,1]. The number of consumers is
normalized to one. There is perfect and complete information about consumer tastes distribution
and the monopolist's production costs.
Let x denote the consumer whose favourite variety is at a distance x from the left limit of
the interval [0,1]. The reservation price for the rental services provided by the good for
consumer x is equal to     1 - t x - a , where t is a positive constant and a is the variety of the
durable good produced by the monopolist. Consumers are thus modeled as in Hotelling's
standard model (Hotelling (1929)). The problems related to the non-existence of an equilibrium
price solution for some locations in Hotelling's model (described by D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979)) do not appear when the monopolist faces his own future price competition.
Note that the consumer's reservation price must be interpreted not in terms of transportation
costs but in terms of the difference between consumer's preferred variety and the variety
produced by the monopolist.2 For simplicity but without loss of generality, we assume that
    t ³ 2.
The analysis is modeled as a game with two stages: First, the monopolist decides the
variety of the good to produce. Second, the firm decides the quantity to be produced in each
period. The solution concept is that of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To solve the
problem we must then proceed by backward induction from the last stage of the game.
We assume that the monopolist's choice of product variety is irreversible, that is, it
cannot be changed over time. One may think, for instance, that the firm is adopting a
2Contrary to recent applications, Hotelling (1929) does not fix a maximum reservation price for the consumer
whose preferred variety is exactly the one produced by the firm. We need to establish such a level because
otherwise the monopolist's equilibrium price could not be determined. In our model, and without loss of
generality, it is normalized to 1.4
technology that will allow it to produce just that variety of the good and not any other. Without
loss of generality we assume that      a Î [0,0.5].
Let p be the rental price of the good. The consumer whose preferred variety is x, such
that     x > a, and who is indifferent between renting and not renting one unit of the good is
determined from the equation:     1 – t(x – a) - p = 0. Consequently,     x = 1 – p
t + a. Note that:
.If      x £ 2a, the total amount rented is given by     q = 2(x - a) = 2
t(1-p).
.If      1 ³ x > 2a, the total amount rented is given by 
  
q = x =
1 - p
t + a.
As a result, the inverse demand function for the services yielded by the good is:
   p = 
  î ï
í
ï ì    1 - t
2q if q £ 2a
   1 + ta - tq if 2a £ q £ 1
                                                      (1)
Figure 1 shows the rental demand:
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Figure 1: Rental demand of the durable good.5
It is important to note that the change in the shape of the demand curve (its kink) is due
to the existence of potential buyers only on one side of the market when the quantity produced
is higher than 2a. In this case, an increase of production implies a strong reduction in the price
charged.
Let    qj
i denote the quantity produced by the monopolist i (where i=r for the monopolist
renter and i=s  for the monopolist seller) in period j, j=1,2. Let    pj
i denote the corresponding
price charged by monopolist i  in period j. Let    ai denote the corresponding product variety
produced by monopolist i. Considered, next are the case of the monopolist renter and the case
of the monopolist seller.
A. Monopolist renter
This type of monopolist can commit to a future schedule of production. As a result, he
will try to guarantee the highest demand for his product and, accordingly, he will try to locate
far enough from the left end of the variety distribution. In other words, the monopolist wants to
sell to the same number of consumers on both sides of the variety produced (a). This type of
monopolist solves the following problem:
   (1 - t
2q1
r)q1









The solution is:     q1
r * = 1
t, q2
r * = 0,     p1
r = p2
r = 1
2, the monopolist produces a variety
    ar * ³ 1
2t and obtains profits      pr = 1
t .
The assumption that      t ³ 2 guarantees that the market will not be covered by the
monopolist. Note that when      t £ 1 the monopolist renter covers the market. This case is
uninteresting since there is no commitment problem. Moreover, when      1 < t < 2, the qualitative
results of the paper do not change.6
B. Monopolist seller
This type of monopolist, who cannot commit to a future schedule of production, will
choose the intertemporally consistent plan of production that maximizes the present value of
revenues. Note that this type of monopolist has four possibilities:
I.-     q1
s < 2as < q1
s + q2
s
II.-     q1
s + q2
s < 2as
III.-     q1
s < 2as = q1
s + q2
s
IV.-      q1
s ³ 2as
Next, we proceed to solve the monopolist seller problem considering these four
possibilities.
    Case I: q1
s < 2as < q1
s + q2
s.
The maximization problem of the monopolist must be solved by backward induction;
that is, we first solve for the monopolist's optimal choice in period two and then, given this
optimal solution, we solve his problem in period one: find the     q1
s that maximizes the present
value of his revenues. Finally, we determine the value of    as that maximizes his profits.
At time j=2, taking into account (1) and given     q1
s, the monopolist solves:






subject to     q1
s + q2
s > 2as.










At time j=1 the monopolist will solve for the     q1
s that maximizes the present value of his
revenues, taking into account (1):7

































4 ,     1
3t < as < 5
9t. As a result, in case I the firm chooses the highest value of
  as and its profits have an upper limit in the value      p
s = 76
81t.
    Case II: q1
s + q2
s < 2as.
At j = 2, taking into account (1) and given     q1
s, the monopolist solves the following
problem:




















When j = 1 the monopolist will solve for the     q1
s that maximizes the present value of his
revenues, taking into account (1):























The solution to this problem is:     q1
s = 4
5t,     q2
s = 3
5t,       ps = 0.9
t ,    "     as > 0.7
t .
    Case III: q1
s < 2as = q1
s + q2
s.
The consistent schedule of production such that     q1
s + q2
s = 2as must satisfy the following
conditions:
First, given     q1
s, the     q2
s in which the marginal revenue corresponding to the rental demand
   p2
s = 1 + tas - tq1
s - tq2
s is zero must be smaller than or equal to     2as - q1
s;8
Second, given     q1
s, the     q2
s in which the marginal revenue corresponding to the rental
demand 
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2  is zero must be greater than or equal to     2as - q1
s,
    1
3t + q1
s
3 £ as £ 1
2t + q1
s
4 .3 Thus, at j=1 the monopolist solves the following problem:4
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s
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From the first order conditions of this problem we get the following solution:








     Case IV: q1
s ³ 2as.
At j=2 the monopolist solves the following problem:










1 + tas - tq1
s
2t ,      q1
s ³ 2as.
At time j=1 the monopolist will solve for the     q1
s that maximizes the present value of his
revenues, taking into account (1):
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s - tq2
s q1
s + 1 + tas - tq1
s - tq2
s q2
s + l q1







1 + tas - tq1
s
2t .
From the first order condition of this problem we get the following solution:
    as = 5
11t,     q1
s = 10
11t,     q2
s = 3
11t,      ps = 9
11t.
Comparing the solutions obtained in the different cases, the following proposition can
be established:
3
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4Given that the firm is a monopolist, the solution choosing first as and then q1
s remains the same if as and q1
s are
chosen simultaneously.9
Proposition 1: If the monopolist seller cannot commit to a future schedule of
production he will produce the variety     as * = 8
13t, and the quantities     q1
s * = 11
13t, q2
s * = 5
13t.
Proof: Comparing the profits corresponding to the different cases it is straightforward
to verify that the optimal variety and schedule of production is such that:     as = 8
13t,





  The monopolist who cannot commit to future production chooses to produce a variety
such that he credibly commits not to reduce future prices drastically. This can be guaranteed by
moving away from the central varieties and by deciding to produce a variety such that a strong
reduction in future prices would allow the firm to attract fewer additional consumers that in the
previous period.
In the first period the monopolist renter would produce a higher quantity than the
monopolist seller, but finally, the accumulated quantity produced would be lower than the one
chosen by the monopolist who can commit. Note also that both types of monopolists may
produce the same variety. The choice of product variety for the monopolist has not been
considered in the extensive literature on durable goods. However, as this paper shows, from
the monopolist seller's point of view, the choice of product variety is a means at his disposal to
mitigate his commitment problem. More precisely, the monopolist seller has an incentive to
locate himself far enough from the central variety (     a = 0,5) to get a lower residual demand for
the second period. He chooses a variety that guarantees that the accumulated production is such
that all consumers with a preferred variety lower than that chosen by the seller always buy the
good. In this case, in order to produce an additional unit, the monopolist will have to drastically
reduce the price because the potential buyers are located only on one side of the market.
Although it increases the commitment ability, if we analyze the equilibrium variety chosen
(     as * = 8/13t), this drastic price reduction is never interesting from the monopolist seller's point
of view.10
3.  Social Welfare: Endogenous versus Exogenous Demand
Social welfare may be defined as the sum of the present value of consumer surplus and
monopolist's profits. Comparing social welfare under both types of monopolists, the following
proposition can be established:
Proposition 2: Social welfare is higher when the monopolist cannot commit to a
future schedule of production than when he can.
Proof: In the case of the monopolist seller, social welfare (   W
s) is:     W
s = 79
52t. Social
welfare in the case of the monopolist renter (   W
r) is:     W
r = 3
2t. Therefore,     W
s > W
r. 
The result obtained in Proposition 2 is standard in the literature on durable goods when
both linear demands and the assumption that the monopolist may only choose the quantities are
considered simultaneously (e.g. Bulow (1982), Kahn (1986)). However, the literature shows
that this result relies crucially on these assumptions (see for instance, Bulow (1982), Bond and
Samuelson (1984), Bulow (1986) and Malueg and Solow (1989)). Malueg and Solow (1989),
for example, show that the result that social welfare is higher when the monopolist cannot
commit to a future schedule of production is not robust to changes from linear to kinked
demands. This paper shows that Malueg and Solow's result might change when the monopolist
is also allowed to choose the variety to be produced, that is, when the kinked demand is
determined endogenously.
Malueg and Solow (1989) find that the existence of a kink in the rental demand may
imply that the "social welfare may be raised or lowered by requiring the monopolist to sell,
rather than rent, its output." In their analysis the kink and the shape of the demand curve are
determined exogenously. The shape of the demand curve to the right of the kink is crucial to get
different results: social welfare is higher when the monopolist sells the good than when he rents
it if and only if the change in the shape of the rental demand is mild enough.11






   Rental value =1 - q
   Rental value =(n - q)/(2n - 1)
Figure 2: Malueg and Solow's rental demand.
Note, for instance, that when     n = 0.75 their rental demand coincides with the one in our
model when     t = 2, product variety a is exogenous and     a = 0.25. With these parameter values,
as Malueg and Solow conclude, social welfare is higher when the monopolist can commit to a
future schedule of production than when he cannot. However, when the product variety is a
choice of the monopolist, social welfare will be greater for the monopolist seller than for the
monopolist renter. In our model, for instance, for     t = 2, the monopolist seller would choose
   as * = 4/13, and the corresponding social welfare would be     W
s = 79/104. The monopolist renter
would choose      ar * ³ 0.25, and social welfare would be     W
r = 0.75. Therefore, social welfare is
higher under the monopolist seller than under the monopolist renter. This example shows that
the consideration of endogenous rental demands may play an important role in the implication
that the ability or inability of commitment to a future schedule of production has for the analysis
of social welfare in the durable goods monopolist literature.12
4. Concluding Remarks
The choice of product variety by a durable goods monopolist can be very important from
a strategic point of view. When the monopolist decides on the variety of the good to be
produced, he may choose between situations in which the demand is high and the firm cannot
commit not to flood the market with the product in the future and situations in which the
demand is low but he can commit not to flood the market in the future.
Contrary to the case in which the monopolist who can commit produces a variety such
that he has the highest demand (e.g. the central variety), the monopolist who cannot commit to a
future schedule of production finds it more profitable to sell a variety of the durable good which
allows him to mitigate his commitment problem. The reason is that with respect to the central
variety choice, this solution generates new intertemporally consistent production schedules
which increase monopolist seller profits. The monopolist chooses his product variety with a
goal of making sure that a strong reduction in future prices will not be profitable because it
allows the firm to attract few additional consumers.
This paper also shows that contrary to the case in which product variety is exogenously
determined, under endogenous choice of product variety, social welfare is always higher when
the monopolist cannot commit to future production levels.
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